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THIRD WAVE OF DISABILITY MOVEMENT
ECONOMICS VERSUS CIVIL RIGHTS
Bonnie ODayt
INTRODUCTION
To achieve specific political and social goals, advocates for
disability programs have used a series of messages about the
societal role of people with disabilities. The first generation of
disability programs was based on the "protectionist model," and
was grounded in the beliefs that people with disabilities were
abnormal and that society needed to be protected from them.
The resulting policies included institutionalization and manda-
tory sterilization.'
Subsequently, the "charity model" of disability emerged. Its
advocates maintained that people with disabilities should be
treated benevolently. The result of the model was the creation
of federal income subsidy programs and hundreds of philan-
thropic agencies. The charity model can be characterized as the
first wave of the disability movement.
The second wave of the disability movement was signalled
by the development of the "rehabilitation-medical model," which
attempted to ameliorate the effects of disabilities by providing
training and medical intervention. This led to the establish-
ment of physical medicine and vocational rehabilitation pro-
grams. A more recent branch of the second wave is the "minori-
ty-independent living" model. Its advocates maintain that the
disabled individual is not inherently dependent; rather, disabili-
ty is a social construct created by prejudicial attitudes.2 Thus,
under this model, the "disability problem" is remedied by the
modification of environments and the enactment and enforce-
ment of civil rights legislation.3
I Doctoral Candidate, Heller School of Social Welfare Policy, Brandeis
University. B.S., Augsburg College, 1977; M.P.A., University of Virginia,
1991.
' WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL
MODELS 35-82 (perm. ed. rev. 1975).
2 See Harlan Hahn, Paternalism and Public Policy, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr.
1983, at 36.
' Gerben DeJong, Independent Living: From Social Movement to Analytic
Paradigm, ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. AND REHABILITATION, Oct. 1979, at 60.
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All of these models are interconnected, and certain strands
of each are present in most disability legislation and programs
today. Cost-benefit arguments have been an integral part of the
justifying rationale for both vocational rehabilitation and civil
rights approaches to disability policy. The approach first sur-
faced to combat the myth that people with disabilities would
always burden society and it provided a justification for voca-
tional rehabilitation programs. Cost-benefit analysis compares
the cost of vocational rehabilitation with the benefits which
result when a rehabilitated individual becomes employed.4
During the 1970s, the content of disability legislation began to
reflect civil rights and equal opportunity rationales. Of course,
economic considerations continued to play a major role in policy
formulation.'
This essay examines these approaches using the ADA as an
example. It argues that a new third wave approach should be
developed in which civil rights considerations eclipse employer-
based cost-benefit rationales as the dominant justification for
disability legislation.
I. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
The economic and civil rights approaches to disability policy
often yield conflicting legislative results. Economic arguments
generally yield bipartisan support for proposed legislation, but
protection for all persons with disabilities is often difficult to
achieve. Conversely, the civil rights approach focuses on rights
regardless of economic costs and thereby protects even the most
severely disabled people. Yet, given the national deficit and the
4 See, e.g., Monroe Berkowitz & Edward Berkowitz, Benefit Cost Analysis,
REHABILITATION RES. REV., at 5 (1983).
' For example, an employee's right to "reasonable accommodation" under
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
III 1992), is limited to cases where the provision of an accommodation would
not cause an "undue hardship" on the employer or business. 42 U.S.C
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1992). The definition first proposed by disability
advocates would have required an employer to provide accommodations for a
disabled employee unless such accommodations would threaten the existence
of the employer's business. That definition was ultimately rejected. See
BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAw 20:30 (1990 & Supps. 1991-93)
(citing Hearings Before the Senate Jud. Comm. on Labor and Human Resourc-
es and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (May 9,
10 & 16 and June 22, 1989)).
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need for bipartisan support, the economic approach continues to
dominate policy formation.
Even some of the strongest disability advocates continue to
use the economic approach. For example, they claim that
vocational rehabilitation programs are efficient because every
dollar expended results in a savings to the taxpayer.6 Support-
ers of independent living and special education services justify
funding for their programs based upon a cost-benefit analysis.7
Over the years, campaigns to encourage employers to hire
people with disabilities created the image that hiring them was
cost-effective. Advocates for the disabled asserted that accom-
modations were inexpensive and that people with disabilities
would be hard-working, loyal, and permanent employees.
Other disability advocates assert that disability programs
and legislation should be based solely upon civil rights princi-
ples. These "minority model" advocates view persons with
disabilities as members of a minority group, limited by discrimi-
nation and prejudice rather than by physical or sensory condi-
tions. They argue that nothing inherent in being disabled
makes an individual dependent and non-productive. Echoing
the claims of civil rights leaders of past decades, they assert
that limitations faced by the disabled are solely the result of
stereotypes. Thus, a radical civil rights approach - mandating
non-discrimination and equal access for all regardless of cost -
is the only way to solve the disability problem.
The economic and civil rights messages, when combined
into a single piece of legislation, can serve many purposes. The
ADA is a case in point. During the debate over the ADA, civil
rights arguments were used persuasively to provide a moral
justification for the law. A complementary rights-based argu-
ment established people with disabilities as an identifiable and
disadvantaged constituency - similar to women and minorities
- which should be afforded similar protection under the law.
Disability advocates also stressed that equal rights for
people with disabilities could be provided relatively inexpensive-
ly.8 They echoed earlier vocational rehabilitation advocates by
6 See, e.g., Berkowitz & Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 5.
7 See, e.g., EDWARD BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY, AMERICA'S PROGRAM
FOR THE HANDICAPPED 163-67 (1987) (discussing the prevalence of cost-benefit
analysis in government attempts to effect employment of the disabled).
' See, e.g., Susan F. Rasky, How the Disabled Sold Congress on a New Bill
of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at E5 ("[B]illions of tax dollars a year
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asserting that the minimal costs of access and accommodation
would be recouped by employers as people with disabilities
became superior long-term employees. They also asserted that
these costs would be recovered through increases in the tax base
as more people with disabilities left the welfare rolls and went
to work. These economic arguments helped ensure passage of
the ADA, but many economists have predicted that the resulting
law will primarily benefit those who need the least amount of
assistance: those with less severe or less complicated disabili-
ties. Thus, ultimately, the solid foundation of protections
secured by the rights-based arguments was severely limited by
the inclusion of exceptions required to satisfy financial cost-
benefit considerations.
II. THE ADA: AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN RIGHTS AND ECONOMICS
Enacted in 1990, the ADA prohibits discrimination against
Americans with disabilities with respect to employment, public
services, and public accommodations. The ADA provides "a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination" against this previously under-protected
population.9 The employment provisions of the ADA, however,
provide a snapshot of the conflict between rights-based and
economics-based arguments. They demonstrate how cost consid-
erations limit the ADA's impact on employment for the people
with the most substantial disabilities.
Under the ADA, an individual with a disability is one who
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
the performance of one or more major life activities, is regarded
as having such an impairment, or has a record of such an
impairment.' ° Disability, therefore, is viewed as a product of
are likely to be saved in federal aid to disabled people who would rather be
working").
9 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. III 1992). Although the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (Supp. IV 1992), prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability by federal agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of
federal financial assistance, and although some states have enacted legislation
barring discrimination on the basis of disability, the protection offered by such
statutes remains limited.
10 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1992). See generally TUCKER &
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 20:3-12 (describing who qualifies as disabled
under the ADA); id. at 4:1 (discussing who falls under the disability umbrella
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the interaction between the individual and her environment.
The definition is left deliberately general. Specific disabilities
- such as traumatic brain injury, cerebral palsy, or manic
depression - are not listed in the Act. Whether these disabili-
ties substantially limit one or more major life activities must be
determined on a case by case basis."
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against
people with disabilities by employers who have twenty-five or
more employees - fifteen or more beginning July 26, 1994.12
To be protected under the Act, the disabled employee must
satisfactorily perform the essential functions of her job,"3 meet
all the appropriate educational and skill requirements, and be
"otherwise qualified"' 4 for the job. Employers may not discrim-
inate against persons with disabilities in hiring, firing, promo-
tion, wages, or any other privilege or benefit of employment. 5
The ADA requires employers to provide "reasonable accom-
modations" for qualified individuals with disabilities. 6
Through the reasonable accommodation requirement, the ADA
compels employers to adapt to an individual's disability at all
stages of the employment process, from pre-employment testing
to hiring and promotions.'
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
"
1See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 11-4 to 11-8 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
12 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (Supp. III 1992).
13 When determining what job functions are "essential," numerous factors
are considered, including the employer's judgment. If an employer has
prepared a written job description, it shall be evidence of the essential
fimctions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. III 1992); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(n) (1993).
14 An "otherwise qualified" person with a disability is one who, with
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(Supp. III 1992).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1992).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 1992).
17 Id.
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The term "reasonable accommodations" encompasses a wide
variety of job adaptations. Specific examples of reasonable
accommodations might include:"8
(1) Job restructuring: For example, a secretary with a
visual disability who cannot file printed material could exchange
duties with another employee;
(2) Modifying work schedules: Examples include adjusting
the work schedule for a mobility impaired person who relies on
public transportation that is only available on a limited sched-
ule, or for a person with a disability who requires time off for
medical appointments or periodic rest;
(3) Making employment facilities physically accessible:
Examples include barrier removal, the installation of ramps, or
widened doorways;
(4) Acquiring or modifying equipment: Examples include
adaptive hardware and software for blind or visually impaired
persons or telecommunication devices for the deaf (TDDs);
(5) Providing readers, interpreters and assistants to help
persons with disabilities perform job related tasks; and
(6) Reassigning an employee who becomes disabled to
another existing, vacant position.
The rights-based requirement for the provision of reason-
able accommodations in the ADA is substantially limited by
economic considerations. Employers need not provide an accom-
modation that would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the
business. 9 Further, an employer need only provide accommo-
dations that would not constitute an "undue hardship 20 -
defined as "an action that involves significant difficulty or
expense."'" Whether a particular accommodation constitutes
I EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 111-16 to 111-21
(1992).
19 This "fundamental alteration" defense is adapted from case law decided
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1988). See
TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5:8-13 (discussing the development of
the fundamental alteration and substantial modification exceptions to the
requirement that employers accommodate persons with disabilities); South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413-14 (1979) (upholding
a college's refusal to modify its existing nursing education program to accom-
modate a prospective student with a major hearing disability because such
modifications would have compromised the essential nature of the nursing
program).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1992).
21 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (Supp. III 1992).
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an undue hardship is determined on a case by case basis,
considering factors such as the nature and cost of the accommo-
dation, the overall financial resources of the employer, and the
impact of the accommodation on the employer's overall opera-
tion.22
The impact on the employer is a primary factor in deter-
mining whether an accommodation is reasonable. Thus, larger
employers with significant resources must provide a higher level
of accommodation than smaller businesses with fewer employ-
ees. At first glance, this rationale seems sensible, as a large
corporation can more easily absorb accommodation costs.
The problem, however, with the economic rationale underly-
ing the ADA is that, by undervaluing important civil rights
considerations, many potential employers are excluded from
coverage. The Act does not apply to businesses having fewer
than fifteen employees. 2 Also, accommodations for people
with more severe disabilities are more expensive and may not
be protected, since the necessary accommodations may not be
considered "reasonable."
Concerns about the cost to employers having fewer than
fifteen employees - businesses which form the backbone of the
American entrepreneurial system - led to their exemption from
the employment requirements under the Act. Thus, the majori-
ty of businesses are not covered by the ADA or any other federal
civil rights legislation.'
Small firms represent the most favorable employment
situation for many disabled people because they are more likely
to hire part-time workers. Access to part-time employment is
important to persons with disabilities for various reasons. For
some, medical restrictions - such as fatigue - confine them to
part-time work. Others must limit the number of hours they
work in order to comply with statutory income requirements, so
that they will not lose publicly funded medical insurance, which
private employers may not otherwise provide. In addition,
because small firms are located more uniformly in urban and
22 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (Supp. III 1992); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v)
(1993).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (Supp. I1 1992).
24 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1988) (exempting
businesses which employ fifteen or fewer workers).
' See Sara D. Watson, An Alliance at Risk: The Disability Movement and
Health Care Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1993, at 60-61.
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suburban neighborhoods and in rural communities, they are
more readily accessible. In sum, cost considerations restrict the
ADA's protection against discrimination for people seeking jobs
in what may be their most favorable employment situations.
Even for employers that are covered under the ADA, the
cost-benefit driven reasonable accommodation provision serves
to exclude many disabled people. While statistics on the costs
of reasonable accommodations - set forth in Tables 1 and 2 -
show that most accommodations are relatively inexpensive, they
also show that a substantial number of adaptations may be out
of the reach of small employers.
TABLE 1
Employers' Reported Costs of
Accommodations for People with Disabilities26
October 1, 1992 - December 31, 1993
Amount Percent
$ 0 15
1- 500 52
500 - 1,000 11
1,001 - 1,500 5
1,501 - 2,000 3
2,000+ 14
Mean = $1,0522 Median $250 N = 211
26 JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, A SERVICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 13 (1994) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy). The
Job Accommodation Network (JAN) provides information on accommodations
for employees with disabilities. To derive these statistics the Job Accommoda-
tion Network sent surveys to 1,169 employers who sought information from
the Network. Survey questions assessed satisfaction with Network services,
whether an accommodation was provided, and the costs and benefits of the
accommodation.
Costs of accommodations included purchasing adaptive equipment,
additional training and hiring a reader, sign language interpreter, or personal
assistant. Of the 1,169 surveys sent, 567 (48%) were returned. Thirty-six
percent of the 535 responding to the question, "Did you use the information
provided by JAN to make an accommodation?" answered affirmatively. 211
answered the question, "How much did the accommodation cost you to make?"
and 114 answered the question, "How much money did the company save
because of the benefits you indicated?" Id. at 13-14.
27 One accomodation costing $18,000 caused the mean to rise substantially
above the median,
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TABLE 2
Employers' Reported Benefits of
Accommodations for People with Disabilities'
October 1, 1992 - December 31, 1993
Amount Percent
$ 0 3
1- 2,500 24
2,500- 5,000 14
5,001- 7,500 10
7,501 - 10,000 7
10,000+ 42
Mean = $16,142 Median = $7,250 N = 114
Advocates using economic analysis cite these data to assert
that people with disabilities can be accommodated in the work-
place relatively cheaply.29 The data show that fifty percent of
all accommodations can be provided for less than $500, and that
eighty-five percent of accommodations cost less than $2,000.
These data also reveal that the median cost of an accommoda-
tion is about $250. Based on mean costs and benefits, every
dollar invested in an accommodation brings $15.34 in benefits
over the long run." This analysis may give potential employ-
ers the impression that it is "cheap" to accommodate people
with disabilities.
A more careful reading of the data, however, also reveals
that fourteen percent of accommodations cost more than $2,000
and that one accommodation costs over $18,000. Thus, while
the assertion that it is inexpensive to accommodate an individu-
al with a disability is true most of the time, it is also true that
in approximately fourteen percent of the cases, the costs of
accommodations are $2,000 or higher. The higher cost of
accommodations for these latter workers is not obvious from the
data and this conceals the likelihood that employers may be
Specific benefits resulting in cost savings included: "hiring or retention
of a qualified employee, eliminated cost of training a new employee, saved
workers' compensation and/or other insurance costs, increased the workers'
productivity, and other." JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORKp, supra note 26, at 14.
'Despite the pivotal role of' providing accommodations to employed
persons with disabilities, remarkably little is known about accommodation
costs across different sectors of the economy or across disability groups.
" $15.34 is the quotient of dividing the mean benefit ($16,142) by the
mean costs ($1,052).
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unwilling or unable to hire someone with a more severe disabili-
ty who requires a higher level of accommodation.
The data is also misleading because it reflects the experi-
ence of people who are already employed. One possible explana-
tion for the relatively low accommodation costs is that only
those persons with disabilities that can be accommodated
relatively cheaply have been able to obtain employment. Over-
all accommodation costs may rise as more people with disabili-
ties enter the labor force. 3'
Under the ADA, employers will be responsible for bearing
these rising costs. Tax credits and deductions could reduce the
costs of accommodation for some employers, but a survey of 921
employers revealed that only twenty-seven percent believe that
tax incentives will induce more employers to hire people with
disabilities. 2 Possible explanations for this attitude are that
employers' lack awareness of the existence of tax incentives,
that tax incentives offer no benefit to corporations whose profits
are so marginal that they pay little or no taxes, and that the
paperwork necessary to obtain the credit is not worth the
trouble. In any case, employers bear the brunt of paying for
accommodations under the ADA, even though society as a whole
reaps the benefits. Whether employers will truly be willing to
assume these costs remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit arguments were among the most persuasive
during the legislative debate over the ADA. However, due to
the cost-limiting nature of these arguments, the Act does not
sufficiently protect those persons with disabilities who require
a higher level of accommodation. If the second wave message
about people with disabilities was that they deserved equal
rights and employment opportunities and that accommodations
could be provided relatively cheaply to achieve those goals, a
third wave message about the efficacy of hiring and accommo-
dating individuals with disabilities must develop.
This new message must have civil rights for persons with
disabilities as its bedrock, with the understanding that some
31 See Thomas N. Chenkos, The Economics of Employment, 69 MILBANK Q.
150, 153 (Supp. 1/2 1991).
32 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE DISABLED, THE ICD SURVEY II:
EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS 100 (1987).
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accommodations for persons with severe disabilities may be
expensive and that an analysis based only on costs and benefits
to employers may incorrectly suggest that some societally
beneficial accommodations should not be provided. To ensure
that persons with disabilities - including those with severe
disabilities - are given equal access to opportunity, social policy
cannot depend solely on the costs and benefits of accommodation
to individual employers. To provide the societally optimal level
of accommodations to individuals with disabilities, the costs and
benefits to society as a whole must inform the accommodation
analysis.
In applying this analysis, it is not equitable to rely solely on
employers to fund necessary accommodations. If society as a
whole reaps the benefits of providing equal treatment for per-
sons with disabilities, then society as a whole must assume the
costs. Shifting some of the burden of accommodation from
employers to the taxpayer would benefit individuals with dis-
abilities because employers would be more likely to hire them if
they were not responsible for the full cost of providing the
necessary accommodations.
Basing disability rights legislation on cost-benefit analysis
raises another serious issue. Once the ADA is fully implement-
ed - and we are probably at least a generation away from that
reality - should people with disabilities continue to receive
Social Security and other income subsidies based solely on the
presumption that their disability renders them unable to work?
At what point will policymakers act on the assumption that
people with disabilities are expected to work and begin to
seriously challenge the expenditures for federal disability
benefit programs? While this expectation would probably have
the positive result of more people with disabilities becoming
self-sufficient, in some cases people with disabilities who are not
able to work will be unable to receive the federal and state
assistance they need.
Disability advocates must begin to think clearly about the
ramifications of using narrowly defined economic arguments to
justify disability-based programs and laws. While economic
arguments may serve to support programs that assimilate those
who are closest to the "able-bodied" norm into the larger society,
they may have the unfortunate result of further isolating and
segregating individuals with the most severe disabilities.
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